Sunday, June 7, 2009

History repeating itself


The Lebanese elections in 2009 has used the same electoral law as in the 1960s, relying on confessional representation according to the place of birth. So why don't we look at some analysis from the 1960s regarding the election conducted in 1964.

Here is what Michael Suleiman wrote Elections in a Confessional Democracy (Elections in a Confessional Democracy, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 29, No. 1, (Feb., 1967), pp. 109-128):

"...the electoral process in Lebanon indicates certain trends which show that the system is capable of limited, self-induced, structural modernization. These trends constitute a significant increase in voter participation, a gradual broadening of the recruitment process and an increasing competitiveness in parliamentary election contests.

These trends may not be very significant unless combined with sociopolitical and administrative attributes of a "modern" or "developed" political system. Confessionalism can hardly be considered to constitute such an attribute.

The special brand of democracy which operates in Lebanon places certain limitations upon the electoral process-limitations which no amount of administrative and/or educational and economic reforms can counteract.

...in the absence of widespread political parties and because of the persistence of “zu'ama", feudalism continues to be the outcome. Thus, where a za'im is well-entrenched and can deliver sufficient votes in his district, he may and does pick and choose whom to have on his list and for what price. An important price often paid is political subservience in parliament once elected.

As the electoral fight is between the members of each sect, the Lebanese confessional system not only strengthens heterogeneity and sectarian divisiveness but further subdivides each sect into rival clans. And the electoral lists are usually no more than a coalition of clans from the various sects to be represented.

In other words, an alliance of confessionalism and feudality cripples the Lebanese electoral process. Furthermore, as there is no effective limitation on campaign expenditure and since the candidature fee is high ($1000 which is forfeited unless the candidate receives 25 per cent of the vote in his district), only the well-to-do can afford to run and the rich candidates are favored. No change in this situation was evident in 1964."

Well in 2009 no change was evident too...


An election based on sectarian and confessional divisions

Many know that Lebanon has 18 confessions, representing almost all religions in the Eastern Mediterranean. But there is one major religion still missing, that of simple citizens who are sick of being labeled as religious followers, and being abused by the ruling class in the name of God (whatever he/she might be).

In any case, the mosaic of Lebanon's elections lies on a deceptive trick played by the ruling class, in order to recreate itself and block any change, through carefully tailored electoral districts. These districts are drawn around the limits of registered sectarian affiliation, in order for sectarian leaders to better control the masses. The good old "divide et impera".

The table below shows the electoral districts in Lebanon, and the share of each sect in each district's registered citizens (except Beirut, which is further divided into 3 electoral zones under the 2009 Law).



A further analysis of this table can reveal the 'political bargaining power' of sects in each district. The graph below shows first the districts where the main sects have influence, i.e. a sizable share allowing to make political deals and bargaining. Sunnis have 11, Shi'a 12, Druzes 5, Maronites 11, and Orthodox, Catholics and Armenians each 2 districts.

What is also noteworthy is districts where sects have a strong majority (way above the 51% threshold). Sunnis have 4, Shi'a 6, Druze 1, Maronites 6 and Orthodox 1.

With the representation of Sunnis and Shi'a almost entirely confiscated, on one hand by the Saudi-backed islamic moderate, son of former Prime Minister, and on the other hand by Hizbullah, backed by Iran; and with the Druze also under the grip of one feudal lord, the battle remains on who controls the Christian vote (Maronites, Orthodox, Catholics and Armenians). This why in these elections in 2009 the real electoral battles are fought on 'Christian land'.

Who is really voting in Lebanon's elections? And who isn't...

Almost 3 million registered voters in Lebanon are expected on June 7 to vote. But more than another 1.5 million cannot. Here are the reasons why.

First, the current electoral law excludes Lebanese voters living outside Lebanon (our famous emigrants), who make up almost 450 thousands (these are first-time migrants).

Second, the electoral law excludes voters between 18 and 21, as the law was amended just before these elections, with no time for implementation. So almost 300 thousands young citizens can't vote this year.

Third, armed forces are also denied their voting rights, so here are almost 80 thousands individuals also banned from the vote.

Fourth, there are many groups residing in Lebanon for more than 10 years, who are 'quasi-Lebanese', i.e. all politicians are denying them Lebanese nationality but everyone knows that eventually they will stay in the country. These are Palestinian refugees (almost 400 thousands), and long-stay foreign workers (roughly 100 thousands).

So if you do the math, almost half of the current electorate is denied from giving their say in these "crucial" elections. This is not to count citizens who do not identify with the sectarian nature of this masquerade.